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Thirty-five years ago, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (Conference) and the American Law Institute (ALI) published the first
Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code (Code or UCC). I Since then, Article
2 of the Code, that porous codification of the rules governing contracts for the sale
of goods, 2 has easily insinuated itself into the body of the law of contracts. Indeed,
Article 2's impact extends beyond its defined scope to affect other areas of contract
law, as is demonstrated by many provisions of the Restatement Second of Contracts3
and by cases where the UCC clearly did not apply. 4 This Article, however, is not a
discourse on the success of Article 2 in the world of Contract law. 5 Rather, the Article
examines fundamental Code principles through the prism of a discrete portion of
section 2-612(3),6 governing the reinstatement of an installment contract after
material breach by one party, 7 and a related issue of off-contract, restitutionary
recovery under Article 2.
According to section 2-612(3), a party who suffers a material breach of an
installment contract, and thus has the right to cancel the contract, must choose
between exercising the right to cancel (and writing off the value of uncompensated
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I. The American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, UNiFORi
COMMERCIAL CODE-OFECIAL DRwr Txr-T Ara Co.%nEms EnmoN (1952). reprinted in 14 KELLY, UNIFOPM COMMERCIAL COoE:
DRAFrs 1 (1984) [hereinafter cited by volume number, KELLY, and page number].
2. Section 2-102 of the Code provides that Article 2 "applies to transactions in goods." Secton 2-106 provides
that " 'contract' and 'agreement' are limited to those relating to the present or future sale of goods." Unless otherwise
indicated, all citations to the Code are to the 1978 Official Text, contained in SELECrrD COMMERCIAL STATUTEs (West 1985).
3. RESTAmTEENr (SEcoND) Or CO'rRACs (1981). See, W. TWINiNG, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE ReALsT MovE-kIEmr 339
(1973) (noting, inter alia, the Code's impact on the Restatement 2d's treatment of unilateral and bilateral contracts);
Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New Code: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Our New Commercial Law,
I IVu. L. Rsv. 213, 257 (1966) (the Restatement 2d "has capitulated many strategic postions ... under the doctrinal
pressures generated by the Code"). One example of the influence of Article 2 on the provisions of the Restatement is
Restatement 2d § 59, comment A, which bears the mark of UCC § 2-207, the Code provision on deviant acceptances.
4. See, e.g., Universal Builders, Inc. v. Moon Motor Lodge, Inc., 430 Pa. 550, 244 A.2d 10 (1968) (construction
contract case, analogizing to §2-209 of the Code).
5. Article 2 is in effect in 49 of 50 states, the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands. UNIFOR.I COMMRICAL
CODE I U.L.A. I (Master Ed. 1976).
6. UCC § 2-612(3) states:
"Whenever non-conformity or default with respect to one or more installments substantially impairs the value of the
whole contract there is a breach of the whole. But the aggrieved party reinstates the contract if he accepts a
non-conforming installment without seasonably notifying of cancellation or if he brings an action with respect only to past
installments or demands performance as to future installments."
(Emphasis added).
7. Throughout this article, "material breach" will be used interchangeably with "substantial impairment of the
value of the whole contract." The analogy is apt. Cf. J. WHrr AND R. SuSIMERs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIrops
CoMMERc L CODE § 8-3 (2d ed. 1980) (the law of material breach is useful in measuring substantiality in cases of
revocation under § 2-608). Also, "material breach" is shorter.
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performance as a loss) and seeking recovery 8 for such performance (and thereby
reinstating the contract). Did the Code drafters intend to present the aggrieved party
with this "Hobson's choice" and if so, why? This provision for automatic
reinstatement, with no consideration of surrounding circumstances, seems anomalous
in a Code containing many calculated interstices and which, in the main, gives courts
the flexibility to resolve issues on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, the provision
presents the problem of reconciling restricitive literal language with the more liberal,
overall thrust of the Code. I conclude that the "common-law" nature of the Code and
the purposes underlying its provisions should prevail, even where the Code language
appears to deny to the courts their usual interstitial role.
Part I(A) of this Article analyzes section 2-612(3) and the relevant Code
comments. Part I(B) explores the genesis of the reinstatement language in section
2-612(3), within the context of the drafting of Article 2 of the UCC. Part II draws on
the underlying jurisprudential basis of the Code to shed more light on the proper
construction of the Section 2-612 provision.
Part HI of the Article then examines two UCC cases in which a party raised the
provision in the course of defending a suit for breach of an installment contract. In
both cases the breaching parties attempted to whiplash the aggrieved parties by
arguing reinstatement through suit. In each case the courts held that the contracts
were not reinstated. The courts' resolution of the issue will be scrutinized for
consistency with the history of the provision, intent of the drafters, and overall
purposes of Article 2. In addition, one of the cases raises the question of whether an
aggrieved party in these situations can, under the Code, elect to sue off the contract
in restitution. This issue of restitutionary recovery is one which encompasses
remedies available to any aggrieved party, not simply one in an installment contract.
Part IV of the Article discusses the restitution issue.
This Article concludes that the wording of and comments to section 2-612(3)
and that provision's legislative history do not conclusively indicate whether the Code
drafters intended to create the Hobson's choice identified earlier. However,
consideration of the overall purposes of Article 2, along with the foregoing, indicates
that, where the intent of cancellation is clearly communicated to the breaching party,
suit on past installments should not reinstate the contract.9 This Article further
concludes that the Code does not provide for an installment seller's recission and
traditional suit "off the contract" to recover in excess of the contract price for the
goods accepted by the buyer. Such a recovery is inconsistent with the general
remedial policy of the Code. Moreover, restitutionary relief in this context would
require return to the distinction between divisible and entire contracts, a distinction
wisely minimized in Article 2.
8. "Recovery" includes all actions by the buyer or seller as aggrieved party, including expectation and!or
consequential and incidental damages, where appropriate. The term could also include actions of an off-contract
restitutionary nature, although there is some question as to whether such actions are permitted by the Code. See infra text
accompanying notes 63-106.
9. I admit an unabashed implementation of the "method of purposive interpretation" of the UCC, as outlined by
Professor McDonnell. McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Implications for
Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 795, 853-854 (1978).
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I. UCC SECTION 2-612(3)
A. Code Analysis
There are three circumstances under which an aggrieved party reinstates a contact
under section 2-612(3): (a) if she accepts a nonconforming installment without sea-
sonably notifying of cancellation, (b) if she demands performance as to future in-
stallments, or (c) if she brings an action with respect only to past installments. The
common factor linking all three circumstances is the notion of signals sent to the
breaching party-signals which reasonably indicate that the nonbreaching party con-
siders the installment contract to continue to be in existence. While situations (a) and
(b) arguably justify the presumption that such a signal has been sent, this is not
necessarily the case in situation (c). Thus, it would appear that if the aggrieved party
communicates a clear intention to end the contract, the breaching party should not be
misled into thinking that a suit represents anything other than an attempt, after
cancellation, to obtain compensation for past performance.
The first sentence in comment 6 to section 2-612 would seem to support this
rationale.10 It states: "Subsection (3) is designed to further the continuance of the
contract in the absence of an overt cancellation" (emphasis added). The comment
continues: "The question arising when an action is brought as to a single installment
only is resolved by making such action waive the right of cancellation. This involves
merely a defect in one or more installments, as contrasted with the situaton where
there is a true repudiation .... " The comment identifies the purpose of the
subsection, indicating that the three situations outlined therein illustrate circum-
stances where there is less than an "overt cancellation," hence the continuation of
the contract. The second sentence of the comment would seem to indicate that, as a
matter of law, the bringing of the action for past installments reinstates the contract.
But the conclusion stated in the third sentence, i.e. that suit on past installments
"involves merely a defect in one or more installments" is not necessarily true
and should be refutable by the facts of a particular case. Moreover, attempts to
construe the quoted language are hampered by the organization of the comment,
which, in the first two sentences, addresses the actions of the aggrieved party (e.g.,
references to "overt cancellation" and waiver of the "right of cancellation"); in the
third sentence, however, the focus shifts abrubtly to the actions of the breaching
party (e.g., the reference to a "true repudiation"). After the third sentence, the
comment then shifts back to the aggrieved party and her right to cancel. "t The true
10. The Code comments are technically the official comments of the Conference and the ALI and their
authoritativeness differs from state to state. See Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the Uniform Commercial
Code, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 597, 604 ("[Mjost state legislators probably did not consider the comments when they enacted
the text of the Code"). However, it would be a mistake to disregard them, especially since courts often cite the comments
in reaching decisions. J. WHirr AND R. Su..iEs, supra note 7, at 12. ("The courts take to the comments like ducks take
to water even though the legislatures did not enact the Code comments").
11. The remainder of the Comment is as follows:
Whether the nonconformity in any given installment justifies cancellation as to the future depends, not on
whether such a non-conformity indicates an intent or likelihood that the future deliveries will also be defective,
but whether the non-conformity substantially impairs the value of the whole contract. If only the seller's security
in regard to future installments is impaired, he has the right to demand adequate assurances of proper future
performance but has not an immediate right to cancel the whole contact. It is clear under this Article, however,
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import and meaning of the comment is lost in the shifting of emphasis and
focus.
The language of section 2-612(3) and the Code comments are less than
dispositive of the issue of whether every suit on past installments should reinstate the
contract. The Code, however, has a rich legislative history which one can and should
examine before reaching any conclusions.
B. Legislative History
Following each provision of the UCC, the Code drafters provided a reference to
the relevant "Prior Uniform Statutory Provision," if any. In the case of section
2-612, the predecessor provision is Section 45(2) of the Uniform Sales Act (USA),
which contained no reference to reinstatement. ' 2 The USA was promulgated in 1906
by the Conference.' 3 Subsequently, prodded by increasing calls for an overhaul of
the USA and by pending legislation in Congress for a Federal Sales Act,' 4 the
Conference set about the task of promulgating a revised act in 1940. In that year, the
Conference issued a "Draft for a 'Uniform Sales Act, 1940'," which contained a
section 57 on Delivery in Installments.' 5 This section made no mention of
reinstatement, and the accompanying comment focused more on the remedies for
breach of an installment contract and assurances of performance. In 1941, the
Conference released a Draft Revised Uniform Sales Act.' 6 Section 45 of the Draft
Revised Act, which was a modifcation and extension of section 45 of the USA and
that defects in prior installments are cumulative in effect, so that acceptance does not wash out the defect
'waived.' Prior policy is continued, putting the rule as to buyer's default on the same footing as that in regard
to seller's default.
UCC § 2-612 (3), comment 6. Comment 7 addresses the issue of seasonable notification of cancellation under § 2-612(3).
12. U.S.A. § 45(2) provides:
Where there is a contract to sell goods to be delivered by stated instalments, which are to be separately paid for
and the seller makes defective deliveries in respect of one or more instalments, or the buyer neglects or refuses
to take delivery of or pay for one or more instalments, it depends in each case on the terms of the contract and
the circumstances of the case, whether the breach of contract is so material as to justify the injured party in
refusing to proceed further and suing for damages for breach of the entire contract, or whether the breach is
severable, giving rise to a claim for compensation but not to a right to treat the whole contract as broken.
Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Conference of Commissioners on the Uniform State Laws, DRAFT OF AN ACT To
MAKE UNIFORM THE LAw RLATro To THe SALE OF GOODS 169 (1906), reprinted in I U.L.A. § 45(2), at 51-52 (1950).
13. Other uniform laws which were the products of the Conference and which later served as predecessors to
various Articles of the UCC are: NEGOTIABLE INSRU.siEmTs LAW (1896); UNIFORM WAREH uSE RECEPrs ACT (1906); Umroami
STOCK TRANSFER ACT (1909); UNIFoR.-t BILLS OF LADING AcT (1909); UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT (1918); and UNrfos5ItTRuST
REc EIPs ACT (1933). UNIFOssI COMIMERCIAL CODE, 1978 OFFICIAL TEXT Wrm CO.MMENTS AND AP'Dix 21-22 (West 1985).
14. The Proposed Federal Sales Act, H.R. 8176 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) reprinted in 26 VA. L. REv. 668
(1940). See, A Symposium: The Proposed Federal Sales Act, 26 VA. L. REv. 537 (1940). In addition, there was movement
on the international level to unify the law governing the international sale of goods. See W. TvtNeNG, supra note 3, at 277.
For a discussion of the International Sales Convention, see Patterson, UNrrED NATIONS CONVENTON ON Co'nRCrs FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL S E or GOODS: UNIFICATION A D THE TEssON BErWEEN CO ROMIsE AND DotINATtON, 22 STAN. J. INT'L L. 263,
266-68 (1986). See also Rabels, The Drafts of an International Sales of Goods Act and of a Revised Uniform Sales Act,
50 RABELs ZurscHm'r 331 (1986) (a previously unpublished lecture in which the author urged cooperation among the
drafters of the two laws).
15. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, DRAFT FOR A "UNIFORM SALES ACT, 1940"
AFPENDED To AND PART OF A REPORT ON THE UNIFORM SALES ACT To THE COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LA s, reprinted
in I KELLY 220.
16. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, REPORT AND SECOND DRAFT. REVtSED UNioL.t
SALES ACT 1 (1941), reprinted in I KEL.v 269. This draft was prepared with a view towards its being incorporated into the
projected Uniform Commercial Code. Id. at 272.
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section 32 of the Proposed Federal Sales Act, likewise contained no reference to
reinstatement of an installment contract.' 7 Indeed, it was not until 1944, with the
publication of the Proposed Final Draft No. 1 of the Uniform Revised Sales Act that
reinstatement language appears, in section 102(3):
(3) Even though the default or non-conformity in an installment is a breach of the whole
contract the aggrieved party may resort to his remedies as to that installment alone. By doing
so or by demanding performance as to the balance or by accepting the installment without
giving notice within a reasonable time of the intention to treat the whole contract as broken
he reinstates the contract. A request for assurance is not in itself such a demand for
performance. 18
There was no comment accompanying section 102, captioned "Breach in
Installment Contracts." Despite the absence of comment, however, the wording of
the reinstatement provision indicates that reinstatement by suit followed from the
aggrieved party's exercise of a choice ("may resort") to seek recovery as to the past
installment "alone," notwithstanding the breach of the whole contract. The other
two instances of reinstatement (demanding performance as to the balance or
accepting the installment without notice of cancellation within a reasonable time)
would arguably indicate to a reasonable person in the position of the breaching
party19 a conscious decision by the aggrieved to go forward with the contract.
17. Section 45, entitled "Delivery in Installments" (as was the corresponding provision of the U.S.A.) provided
in pertinent part:
(1) Between merchants, if the goods are to be delivered in separate installments, or if payment of part or all of
the price falls due before delivery, or before delivery of a later installment, then a material default in regard to
either any delivery or any payment justifies the opposing party in refusing to proceed. Acceptance of the
defective delivery or payment does not impair such justification. (2) If the aggrieved party duly dispatches
notification of such refusal to proceed, and the defaulting party fails to provide such prompt assurance against
future material default as has mercantile adequacy in the circumstances, then the aggrieved party may cancel the
contract as to the future and have his remedy for breach of the entire contract.
I Ku 470. The other provisions addressed assurances of performance, as did the 1940 Draft, and included a statement
on the policy of the section. This policy statement shed no light on the reinstatement issue.
18. The American Law Institute, UNFom REvisED SALEs Acr § 102(3) (SALEs CHAFrER OF PROFosW COMMERCiAL CODE):
PRoposED FINAL Dswr No. 1 (1944), reprinted in II KEuY 66. The remaining portions of Section 102 are as follows:
(1) Where the contract requires or authorizes delivery installments, and any installment is non-conforming
(a) the buyer may reject it if the nonconformity substantially impairs the value of the installment and cannot
be cured or if the nonconformity is a defect in the required documents.
(b) if the non-conformity does not substantially impair the value of the installment or if it can be substantially
cured and the seller gives adequate assurance of cure the buyer must accept it.
(2) the aggrieved party has all other rights and remedies provided in this Act for non-conformity or default with
respect to the installment involved and, when a non-conformity or default in one or more installments
substantially impairs the value of the whole contract, with respect to the undelivered balance or the
whole.
(4)The party whose performance does not conform has the burden of establishing that the non-conformity can
be cured or does not substantially impair the value of the installment or of the whole contract.
By this time the Revised Sales Act was the joint product of the Conference and the ALl and was viewed by those bodies
as the predecessor to the Sales Chapter in the contemplated Uniform Commercial Code, which itself would be jointly
formulated by the two organizations. See I KEu 3. Section 102 of the 1944 Revised Sales Act appears in II KELLY 65-66.
What was to become § 2-612(3) appears in virtually identical form in § 101 of the Draft Code of Commercial Law
published in 1948 by the ALI. See, The American Law Institute, THE CODE OF COMMERCIAL LAw (Lamsr DRArs OF SIX OF
THE ARlscLEs OF THE COMMERcIAL CODE) (1948), reprinted in V KEu 213, 282.
19. Although the terminology "reasonable person in the position of," does not appear explicitly in the § 2-612
comments or in the comments to any drafts, the tenor of the Code provision and its predecessor indicate a concern that
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The 1949 Draft of the UCC contains a section 2-612(3) and accompanying
comments (6 and 7) which are virtually identical to those of the Official 1952 Text
and every subsequent Official Text of the Code. There is no additional light shed on
the purpose behind the reinstatement language than appears in the comments 6 and 7
of the current text of the Code. Therefore, one is left with the wording of the 1944
Revised Uniform Sales Act, the first text to contain the reinstatement language, as a
guide to the assumption underlying the phrase in section 2-612(3). To reiterate: the
innocent party who demands future performance, accepts nonconforming goods
without seasonably notifying the breaching party of cancellation of the contract or
brings suit exclusively on past installment, reinstates the contract. As stated earlier,
however, while an aggrieved party who demands future performance or accepts
installments without seasonably cancelling sends signals inconsistent with cancella-
tion and arguably should be held to have "waived" a right of cancellation, 20 this is
not necessarily the case with a party who would suffer a loss if she did not recover
for damages relating to the past installments.
A similar observation was made in the New York Law Revision Commission's
study and evaluation of the UCC. In 1953, Governor Thomas Dewey directed the
New York Law Revision Commission (Commission)2' to conduct a detailed study of
the Uniform Commercial Code. The study lasted three years, during which time the
Conference and ALI continued to refine the Code, often with input from the
Commission.2 2 The Commission held hearings and considered reports prepared by its
staff and consultants. 23 One of those consultants was Professor John Honnold, who,
in the Commission's 1955 Study of the Code, wrote the introduction to the discussion
of Article 2 and also performed analyses of several sections of Article 2, including
section 2-612.24
Professor Honnold's comments on section 2-612 centered on three aspects of
that Code provision: (1) the buyer's right to reject a defective installment; (2) the
the breaching party not be misled as to the intention of the aggrieved. The phrase is consistent with the "objective" theory
of contract which places great emphasis on a party being responsible for the reasonable meaning to be attached to her
actions. For a discussion of the objective theory in the area of assent, see E. FRsssoRTH, Co.TRmAcrs § 3.6 (1983); J.
MURRAY, MURRAY ON CoNRCS § 19 (2d rev. ed. 1974).
20. Several pre-UCC cases held that an aggrieved party who had demanded future performance or accepted goods
without seasonable notificaton had waived a right to cancel. See, e.g. William C. Atwater & Co. v. Panama R. Co., 255
N.Y. 496, 175 N.E. 189 (1931); Weinberg v. Gash, 94 Misc. Rep. 303, 158 N.Y.S. 179 (1916).
21. The Commission is a permanent governmental body of the state of New York. See State of New York Law
Revision Commission Report, STUDY Or THE UNIFORM COMMER IAL COD (1954), v.1, Introduction (Burstein and Epstein,
eds., Reprint Ed., 1980) [hereinafter cited by volume number (where appropriate), REPORT, page number, and year, while
the Commission documents are reprinted with their original page numbers at the top, page cites will be to the bottom page
sequential numbering of the reprinted editions]. The records of the Commission's work are said to constitute "the richest
single source of 'legislative history'" on the UCC. R. BRAUCHER & R. RtEoERT, INTRoDucToN To Co~eimctAL TRANsACnoNs
28 (1977). For articles summarizing the legislative history of the Code, see Braucher, The Legislative History of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COL. L. Rrv. 798 (1958); Malcolm, The Uniform Commercial Code: Review, Assessment,
Prospect-November, 1959, 1960 Bus. LAw. 348 (Jan. 1960); and Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. Mmssu L. REv. 1, (1967).
22. See, Malcolm supra note 21, at 350. The Commission began its study with the 1952 Official Text and in the
course of its review also considered the Revised Edition published in 1954, as well as recommended changes to the Code
proposed by an Enlarged Editorial Board and published in 1955. REPORT 18 (1956). The Commission also had available
to it unpublished reports of subcommittes of the Enlarged Editorial Board.
23. REPORT 18 (1956).
24. 1 REPOrT 337-43 (1955).
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buyer's right to cancel the contract;25 and (3) the scope of section 2-612 as indicated
by the definition of "installment contract." His comments on the "reinstatement of
rights under contract subject to cancellation" are insightful and warrant extensive
quotation:
The latter part of subsection (3) provides that the aggrieved party (either buyer or seller)
.reinstates' the contract when he either (a) 'accepts a non-conforming installment without
seasonable notifying of cancellation' or (b) 'brings an action with respect only to past
installments' or (c) 'demands performance as to future installments.' The Uniform Sales Act
has no comparable provision. The cases have, on occasion, held that an innocent party has
'waived ' his right to cancel; a similar idea seems to underlie the Code provisions on failure
to notify of cancellation and on demanding performance as to future installments. There is,
however, little support in present law for the further provision that the contract rights of the
breaching part)' are reinstated if the aggrieved party 'brings an action with respect only to
past installnents'. This language could produce novel and probably unintended conse-
quences (emphasis added; citations omitted).26
Professor Honnold went on to hypothesize the case of a buyer who exercises his right
to cancel, covers at a price equal to the contract price and sues to recover for the
consequential damages resulting from past nonconforming installments. He con-
cluded that reinstatement of the seller's rights would lead to "an untoward result,"
which should be avoided by rewriting subsection (3) so that reinstatement would
follow from actions demanding future performance, thus constituting a waiver of the
right of cancellation. 27
In the Commission's Final Report to the Legislature Relating to the Uniform
Commercial Code, it recommended, inter alia, revision of the section on installment
contracts "to correct what seem[ed] to it errors of drafting.' 28 In an Appendix to the
Report, among the comments on section 2-612, there appears the following:
It was pointed out that the clause in subsection (3), 'or if he brings an action with
respect only to past installments' would include an action for consequential damages for
such installments and could produce anomalous results unless limited to such actions as are
in effect, a demand for future performance. It was recommended that the clause be deleted.2 9
Other fact situations come to mind where the literal application of the language
in section 2-612 could lead to "anomalous results." The buyer in Professor
Honnold's hypothetical might justifiably forego a cover remedy and, if the market
and contract prices are the same at the time the buyer learns of the breach,30 seek
25. Id. at 541-42 (1955). While this section of Professor Honnold's analysis of § 2-612 was entitled " buyer's right
to cancel the contract" (emphasis added), as his analysis indicates, § 2-612(3) addresses the right of the aggrieved party,
buyer or seller, to cancel. Id.
26. Id. at 542.
27. Id. at 542-43. Although he did not say so, I assume that Professor Honnold would have included in addition
those cases where the aggrieved party accepted a nonconforming installment and subsequently failed to give timely notice
of cancellation.
28. RErRT 37 (1956).
29. Id. at 393.
30. UCC § 2-713 provides that when the seller fails to deliver or repudiates, the buyer has the right to recover the
difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price. For the various
ways of determining market price when there has been an anticipatory repudiation of the contract, see J. WnrrE AND R.
Stftx.isr, supra note 7, at 242-47.
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consequential or incidental damages related to the past installments. Or the buyer may
have paid in advance for non-delivered goods and may want to seek recovery of
moneys paid. On the seller's side, there may be a case where the seller delivers
several installments and receives no or only partial payment for the goods. If the
seller resells the remaining contract goods for a price at or greater than the contract
price,3 1 or does not resell and the market price of the remaining goods is at or above
contract price,32 she may want compensation for the goods delivered. 33
Despite the Commission's recommendaton that the reinstatement language be
deleted, the Editorial Board of the UCC took no such action. 34 There were no reasons
given for retaining the language and we are left, once again, to speculate as to what
the drafters intended by the provision. One last source of guidance remains to be
examined: the underlying legal philosophy of the Code.
II. CODE JURISPRUDENCE
The key to understanding the language in section 2-612(3) lies not only in the
accompanying comments and the legislative history of that provision but also in the
jurisprudential character of the Code generally and Article 2 in particular. Much has
been said, and rightly so, of Karl Llewellyn's singular influence on the substance of
the Code, especially Article 2.35 He served as Chief Reporter of the Code and was
31. UCC § 2-706 allows a seller to resell contract goods and recover the differential between the contract and resale
prices.
32. UCC § 2-708(1) allows a seller to recover the differential between the contract and market prices. The two
seller hypotheticals assume that the seller is not a lost volume seller, for whom a remedy under § 2-708(2) would be
available, even if there is a resale at or above contract price or if the market price at the time of delivery is equal to or
greater than the contract price. Cf., Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 285 N.E.2d 311 (1972).
33. A major issue is whether the seller seeking compensation for delivered and accepted goods is limited to a
recovery on the contract or has the option of suing off the contract, in quantum valebant, and recovering an amount in
excess of the contract price. Compare, Mather, Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract: The Case of the Partially
Performing Seller, 92 YALE L.J. 14, 20-21, n. 20 (1982) (no) with Nordstrom, Restitutuion on Default and Article Two
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 19 Vann. L. REv. 1143 (1966), (arguably, yes). See infra text accompanying notes
63-106 for further discussion of this issue.
34. Interestingly, the Editorial Board did respond to one other § 2-612 recommendation, relating to the definition
of an installment contract. The 1952 version of § 2-612(1) contained a requirement that goods be delivered in separate
lots "to be separately accepted and paid for," in order for a contract to fall within the Code provision. The American Law
Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, UNIFOE COMMERCIAL CODE OFcsss. DR r
TE-r AND COMMEN'rS (1952), reprinted in XIV KELLY 1, 243. In his 1955 analysis of § 2-612(3) for the Commission,
Professor Honnold suggested the deletion of the words "and paid for." 1 REPoRT 543 (1955). He stated that the
requirement of separate payment might be difficult to apply and further pointed out that there appeared no reason for the
language. Id. When the UCC Editorial Board issued its 1956 recommendations for changes in the Code, included therein
was a deletion of the words "and paid for" from § 2-612(1). The American Law Institute and the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1956 REcOM.MENDATONS F THE EDrroRIAL Bowm FOR THE UNaroR.%l CO.niMsctL
CODE, reprinted in XVIII KELLY 1, 93. The Editors explained that the change was in response to the criticism of the New
York Law Revision Commission. Id. See also REPoRT 385-86, 389-90 (1956).
The retention of the reinstatement language does not necessarily mean that the Board rejected the Commission's
concern. The Board may have chosen to focus on the most egregious drafting errors which were not ameliorated by the
comments.
35. See generally Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 SrAN. L. REy.
621 (1975); Mooney, supra note 3. See also, W. TwiNING, supra note 3, at 302-40 and J. Warm AND R. SUMR.ms, upra
note 7, at 5-6.
Llewellyn referred to Article 2 as the "heart of the Code.' Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code,
10 U. FwA. L. REv. 367, 378 (1957).
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extensively involved in drafting Article 2.36 Llewellyn believed in statutes writ large
and broad, leaving judges the opportunity, indeed the duty, to fill in the interstices.
This philosophy, applied to commercial legislation, would produce a code capable of
growing with and responding to an ever-changing commercial reality. 37
The UCC has been described as a "common law code" 38 and Article 2 as "a
document whose thrust is not so much to put law on the statute books as it is to coerce
courts into looking for law in life.' '39 The common law nature of the Code lies not
only in the backward look to the source of its rules but also in the forward-looking
design of its provisions, which allows for decisions to be based upon the facts of a
given case, in light of the purpose of a given rule. The ubiquitous presence of the term
"reasonable" in Article 240 is one example of the deliberately, open-textured nature
of the Code and is a testament to Llewellyn's philosophy that "[s]emi-permanent
Acts must envisage and must encourage development by the courts.' '41
Llewellyn complemented his philosophy of code drafting with very definite
ideas about how statutes were to be construed. Those ideas were in turn consistent
with his overall promotion of judicial decisionmaking in the "Grand Style" or the
"Grand Manner":42 "[tlhe courts have duties of creation with regard to statutory
rules quite as much with regard to case law, and the way to perform them is by
36. W. TWN,,o, supra note 3, at 300. He also chaired the Conference Committee which undertook the revision of
the U.S.A., the product of which was the immediate predecessor to Article 2. Id. at 278-85.
37. See e.g., National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, REPORT AND SECOND DRAsr or THE
REvtsm UNroR.t SALES Acr (1941), reprinted in I KELLY 269, 302-05. In this joint report of the Section on Uniform
Commercial Acts and the Special Committee on a Revised Uniform Sales Act, both of which were chaired by Llewellyn,
is a section entitled "The Problem of a Semi-Permanent Code of a Whole Field." After praising judicial decisions where
the courts "work[ed] out the effect of the statute quite as much in terms of its sense and purpose as in terms of its
meticulously examined wording," id. at 305, the Report went on to state:
This manner of approach to statutes is peculiarly needed and is also peculiarly to be expected, when the statute
is both non-political, and non-criminal, in character. It is a manner utterly necessary to the on-going
rejuvenation of a semi-permanent body of written law, amid the inevitable changes of modem conditions. The
way to induce a consistent approach by the courts in these terms is:
(a) to invite that approach expressly, and give it legislative authorization;
(b) to make explicit the principles which underlie any series of particular provisions;
(c) to provide an authoritative Comment full enough so that the reason and reasonableness of the provisions and
the principles are both apparent, and cannot be mistaken; and so that is easy to see, also, where the reason of
a provision leaves off."
Id. The last point is reminiscent of Llewellyn's oft-quoted statement: "[the rule follows where its reason leads; where
the reason stops, there stops the rule." K. LLEWU.L.N, THE BRAMELE BUsH 157-58 (1960).
38. Mooney, supra note 3, at 222, n. 14 (the UCC is a "common law code" in the sense that it is a "statute derived
from the common law of commercial transactions by means of close factually-oriented techniques").
39. Danzig, supra note 35,at 635.
40. See, e.g., UCC § 2-205, 2-206(1), and 2-305(1), (3), and (4). See Mellinkoff, The Language of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 77 YALE L.J. 185, 185-86,209-13 (1967) (criticizing the Code's frequent and (he argues) inconsistent
use of the word "reasonable"); Taylor, Uniformity of Commercial Law and State-by-State Enactment: A Confluence of
Contradictions, 30 HAzLNes L.J. 337, 349-52 (1978) (recognizing that some sections of Article 2 should be nebulous,
including provisions having a standard of reasonableness, but pointing out that this leads to "unavoidable nonuniform-
ity").
41. K. Llewellyn, Re: Possible Uniform Commerical Code (undated memorandum to the Executive Committee on
Scope and Program of the Conference Section of Uniform Commercial Acts), reprinted in W. TwINING, supra note 3, at
524, 526.
42. See, K. LtEALLYN, THE COMMoN Lw TRAomoN: DECDING APaPAS 36 (1960) ("[Tlhe Grand Style of the
Common Law . . . [is] a way of thought and work, not . . . a way of writing. It is a way of on-going renovation of
doctrine... ") Id. Compare this language to the quote from the 1941 Conference Report, supra note 37.
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recognizing what they are . . . . 43 In addition: "The simple basic principle which
expresses both the Grand Manner and today's need is this: It is contrary to a Supreme
Court's duty, and therefore its legitimate power, to allow any statute to remain as an
undigested and indigestible lump in the middle of Our Law." 44
Similar exhortations appear in the UCC Comments, particularly comment I to
section 1-102 (Purposes; Rules of Construction; Variation by Agreement):
This Act is drawn to provide flexibility so that, since it is intended to be a
semi-permanent piece of legislation, it will provide its own machinery for expansion of
commercial practices. It is intended to make it possible for the law embodied in this Act to
be developed by the courts in the light of unforeseen and new circumstances and practices.
However the proper construction of the Act requires that its interpretation and application be
limited to its reason (emphasis added). 45
The last sentence of the excerpt also echoes Llewellyn's belief that the meaning and
purpose of legislation are crucial to the understanding and proper construction of that
legislation. 46 Section 1-102 itself contains the directive: "This Act shall be liberally
construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies."
Thus, each Code provision is to be viewed in light of commercial reality and the
purpose behind its drafting. Comment 6 to section 2-612, as stated earlier, states that
the purpose of subsection (3) is the continuation of an installment contract in the
absence of an "overt cancellation." If that be the purpose, how is the purpose to be
achieved when a suit falls within the literal language of section 2-612(3)? An
examination of case law will determine how faithfully the Code language has been
applied.
IlI. THE Kunian and Cherwall Decisions
There are only two cases where the section 2-612 reinstatement issue was
squarely presented to a court; the Supreme Court of Connecticut decided both cases.
In Kunian v. Development Corp. of America,47 the seller of plumbing and heating
supplies ceased performance and brought suit against the buyer/contractor after the
buyer had failed to pay for several deliveries. The buyer argued, inter alia, that by
bringing the suit, the seller had reinstated the contract and that the seller's failure to
perform the reinstated contract amounted to a material breach. In addressing this
argument, the court referred to a meeting between the parties during which the seller
had attempted to obtain adequate assurances of performance from the buyer. The
buyer promised future performance but subsequently reneged. The buyer's failure to
keep the promise provided the seller with "reasonable grounds for insecurity" within
the meaning of section 2-609(1), 48 such that the seller's later decision to withhold
43. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 42, at 378, quoting from Address on the Current Recapture of the Grand Tradition,
to the Conference of Chief Justices, Miami Beach, Florida, August 18-22, 1959, 9 U. Ctu. LAW ScHooL REcoso 6 (1960).
44. Id.
45. One commentator referred to § 1-102 as the most important Code section and the comment to § 1-102 as the
most important Code comment. Skilton, supra note 10, at 609.
46. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 42, at 379.
47. 165 Conn. 300, 334 A.2d 427 (1973).
48. § 2-609(1) provides:
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further deliveries until the buyer guaranteed payment of the contract price was a
proper demand for adequate assurances. The court went on to hold that the buyer's
failure to provide such assurance "within a reasonable time after the request and after
the action had been brought was a repudiation of the contract and the plaintiff was
excused from further performance under the contract."'49
The language quoted from the opinion immediately raises at least one question.
What did the court mean when it stated that the buyer/defendant's failure to provide
adequate assurances "after the action had been brought" justified the plaintiff's
refusal to make further deliveries under the contract? If, shortly after the plaintiff filed
suit, the defendant had offered to pay the outstanding amounts, would the plaintiff
have been required to continue the contract? Would payment by the defendant turn
what was initially not a reinstatement (the filing of the suit) into a reinstatement,
retroactively? Or did the plaintiff's suit reinstate the contract but the defendant's
subsequent failure to pay constitute a material breach, excusing the plaintiff from
further performance? The court's opinion, cryptic in this regard, offers no clue to the
answers to these questions. Clearly, the court concluded that the defendant had
repudiated the contract; however, the court failed to address adequately the
reinstatement argument made by the defendant. The court more directly addressed
this issue in Cherwell-Ralli, Inc. v. Rytman Grain Co., Inc. 50
In Chenvell, the seller of meal products in an installment contract sued the buyer
for money due for products delivered and accepted. The buyer had been deliquent in
payments from the beginning of the contract period. In addition, the buyer made a
partial payment by check but subsequently stopped payment on the check on the basis
of a rumor that the seller's plant was closing. The court concluded that this action of
the buyer was not warranted under the circumstances, substantially impaired the
A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that the other's expectation of receiving due performance
will not be impaired. When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either
party the other may in writing demand adequate assurance of due performance and until he receives such
assurance may if commercially reasonable suspend any performance for which he has not already received the
agreed return.
49. 165 Conn. at 313, 334 A.2d at 433. The relationship between § 2-609 and § 2-612 (3) has been noted in the
following law review articles and treaties: Note, Breach of Installment Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
7 Wiim-rm L.J. 107, 118 (1971) (stating that, under § 2-612 (3), the aggrieved party who demands assurances of future
performance reinstates the contract and arguing that a party should be able to exercise her rights under § 2-609, without
losing the right to cancel if such assurances are not forthcoming; the result in Kunian is consistent with this position);
Note, A Comparison of California Sales Law and Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, 11 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
78, 98 n. 677 (noting the right of a party to adequate assurances of performance under § 2-609 and potential for loss of
the right to cancel where assurances are sought in an installment contract and concluding that the Official Comment to
§ 2-612 gives precedence to the exercise of rights under § 2-609); I R. Amtvst, A TRANSACnoNAL GIOE TO THE UNIFO -
CoNIROacIAL CODE 288-89, n. 742 ("The breach of an installment contract that does not substantially impair the value of
the whole contact might be reasonable grounds for insecurity with respect to future installments" for which a party may
seek adequate assurances of performance and, in the absence of such assurances a party could treat the contract as
breached, citing Kunian; accord, 3A BENDEx's UForsi Co..wiRcIa. SEsvicE § 14.02[3] at 14-50). See also, Peters,
Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A roadmap for
Article Two, 73 Yst L.J. 199, 227 (1963) (more a linkage between § 2-612(2) and § 2-609).
The last sentence of section 102(3) of the Proposed Final Draft No. I of the Uniform Revised Sales Act distinguished
between demanding performance as to the balance of a contract (compare a demand for "performance as to future
installments" under § 2-612(3)) and a request for assurances (compare a request for "adequate assurance of
performance" under § 2-609). See supra text accompanying note 18.
50. 190 Conn. 714, 433 A.2d 984 (1980).
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value of the whole contract to the seller, and thereby justified the latter's cancellation
of the contract and suit. To the buyer's rejoinder that the seller's suit to recover on
the past installments reinstated the contract, the court responded:
Nor is the seller's remedy to cancel waived, as the buyer argues, by a law suit seeking
recovery for payments due. While Sec. 42a-2-612(3) [of the Connecticut General Statutes]
states that a contract is reinstated if the seller 'brings an action with respect only to past
installments' (emphasis added), it is clear in this case that the seller intended, as the buyer
well knew, to bring this contract to an end because of the buyer's breach. 5'
The court, then, focused on two facts in deciding whether the suit reinstated the
contract: (1) the seller intended to end the contract, and (2) the buyer was aware of
that fact. The suit, therefore, did not automatically reinstate the contract.
The Cherwell decision, although arguably contrary to the literal language of
section 2-612(3), is consistent with the stated purpose of the rule.52 The Code simply
states that an aggrieved party reinstates the contract if he brings an action with respect
only to past installments. That describes exactly the actions of the sellers in both
Cherwell and Kunian. However, at least in Cherwell, an overt cancellation took
place, which the court held was sufficient to preclude reinstatement. This situation is
one where "the reason stops" and thus so should the rule. 53
There is, however, another possibility. That is, that the provision for reinstate-
ment is consistent with the Code's general bias in favor of the establishment and
continuation of contracts in general and installment contracts in particular. 54 For
example: (1) it is easier to establish a contract under the UCC than under pre-Code
law;55 (2) the definition of an installment contract is broadly stated "so as to cover
installment deliveries tacitly authorized by the circumstances or by the option of
either party;" 56 and (3) the Code provisions make it more difficult to cancel
installment contracts than "single-shot" contracts. 57 Moreover, one cannot overlook
51. Id. at 719, 433 A.2d at 987. The buyer also argued, unsuccessfully, that the seller had to utilize the UCC
provisions governing adequate assurances of performance (§ 2-609) before exercising the right to cancel an installment
contract. The court pointed out that, if the actions of the buyer are such as to constitute substantial impairment of the
contract to the seller, there is no need to ask for adequate assurances of the buyer. Id. at 718, 433 A.2d at 986-87. In
so doing, the court distinguished Kunian as a case where there may have been reasonable doubt as to whether the buyer's
breach was substantial. Id. at 718, 433 A.2d at 987.
52. Inconsistency between Code language and accompanying comments is not unusual in Article 2. Another,
perhaps more noted example is the disparate treatment accorded "different" terms in § 2-207(2) and comment 3 to §
2-207. See J. W nHrE AND R. Sumwims, supra note 7, at 27, n.7.
53. See Carroll, Harpooning Whales, of Which Karl N. Llewellyn is the Hero of the Piece; or Searching for More
Expansion Joints in Karl's Crumbling Cathedral, 12 B.C. INo. & Co'%m. L. REv. 139, 150 (1970) ("It is an
understatement to suggest that the Code is not artfully drawn, and it seems reasonable to suggest that courts should either
avoid or approach with great caution interpretations based upon technical grammatical constructions") and Skilton, supra
note 10, at 609 ("Code sections should not be applied literalistically without consideration of results"). See also W.
TwiNiNo, supra note 3, at 322 (noting the Code's requirement that its provisions be liberally construed and referring to "the
Golden Rule" of interpretation which dictates departure from the literal meaning of words when application of that
meaning "would lead to an absurdity").
54. See, e.g., T. QUnNN, Usrost Co.w ti ciAL COD Co.imunraRY AND LAW DwEs'r § 2-612 [A] [4] (1978) (Supp.
1986) ("[tlhe UCC loves the installment contract, and, once it is in place, bends over backwards to keep it in place").
55. See, e.g., UCC § 2-204 (and the "open term provisions in 2-305 to 2-312) and 2-207. See also J. CALA.MW
AND J. PEu.Lo, Co.¢rAcrs 51-53 (2d ed. 1977).
56. UCC § 2-612, comment 1.
57. Compare UCC § 2-601 (the buyer's right to reject goods which "fail in any respect to conform to the contract"
(giving rise to the right to cancel)-said to embody the "perfect tender rule," which, however, is modified by the seller's
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the fact that, even if the reinstatement by suit language in section 2-612(3) was
initially the result of oversight, the 1955 and 1956 Reports of the New York
Commission alerted the Code drafters to the potential "anomalous results" of the
literal application of that provision.5 8
Notwithstanding the foregoing, suit on past installments, where it is clear the
aggrieved party has exercised the right to cance 5 9 should not reinstate the contract.
While it is true that the Code favors the continuation of installment contracts, as
evidenced by the necessity for substantial impairment of the value of the whole
contract before cancellation can occur, once that standard has been satisfied it makes
no commercial sense to force a party to choose between just compensation for past
performance and adherence to a contract materially breached by the other party. 6°
The most sensible construction is that the Code only seeks to continue such contracts
in the absence of overt cancellation. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the
Code provides for reinstatement 6 when suit is brought with respect only to past
installments; suit for damages on the whole contract has no such effect. 62 In the latter
instance, suit unmistakably signals cancellation of the contract.
Finally, the Code drafters' failure to respond to the criticism in the New York
Commission Reports does not necessarily indicate an intention to force the Hobson's
choice on the aggrieved party. Rather, that inaction is better explained by comment
6 to section 2-612, which states the purpose of the provision, and by the overall
command to judges in section 1-102 to construe the Code in light of its purposes. The
crucial interstitial role demanded of judges made it both unnecessary and counter-
productive to dot all of the "i"s and cross all of the "t"s.
right to cure under § 2-508) with § 2-612(3) (requiring substantial impairment of the value of the whole contract for
cancellation). The New York Law Revision Commission noted this differential treatment and recommended that the two
provisions be harmonized with substantial impairment or material breach being prerequisite to the right to cancel in all
cases. See RrPoRT 36-37, 389-90. See also, Honnold, Buyer's Right of Rejection 97 U. PA. L. REv. 457, 476- 78 (1949)
(discussing the distinction in predecessor provisions of the Draft Revised Uniform Sales Act).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
59. In referring specifically to those cases where the aggrieved party makes clear an intention to cancel, I recognize
that where such an intention is not clear, a suit on past installments could reinstate the contract. See R. BsucHri AND R.
RrEGLRT, supra note 21, at 311 (observing that, under § 2-612(3), an aggrieved party can unintentionally reinstate a
contract).
60. Of course, an aggrieved party may choose to go forward with a contract, despite material breach by the other
party to the contract. However, the issue here is whether the aggrieved is forced to make that choice in order to recover
damages.
61. Actually, the use of the word "reinstates" in § 2-612(3) is infelicitious. The reinstatement provision governs
situations where an aggrieved party has failed to make an overt cancellation. Therefore, the provision should more
accurately refer to a waiver of the right of cancellation, as does comment 6 to § 2-612 (3). See supra text accompanying
notes 10 and 11, and Cherwell, 180 Conn. at 719, 433 A.2d at 987 ("Nor is the seller's remedy to cancel waived . . . by
a lawsuit seeking recovery for payments due"). In other words, how can the aggrieved "reinstate" a contract which the
Code assumes that party has not effectively cancelled?
62. For cases where aggrieved parties recovered damages on the whole contract and the courts did not discuss
reinstatement, see Trans World Metals, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 769 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1985); Kirkwood Agri-Trade v.
Frosty Land Foods Internatinal, Inc., 650 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1981); Autonumerics, Inc. v. Bayer Industries, Inc., 696
P.2d 1330 (Ct. App. Ariz. 1985).
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IV. THE RESTITUTION ISSUE
Assuming the court in Cherwell decided the reinstatement issue correctly, there
remains another interesting issue that was actually raised by the plaintiff in Kunian.
The seller in that case sought to recover, not the contract price, but the reasonable
value of the delivered goods63 and thereby raised the spectre of the common law
"rescission" and suit off the contract in quantum meruit.64 The court rejected this
argument, pointing to the fact that the seller's complaint "stated an action on the
contract," thereby limiting recovery to the contract price. 65 In addition, the court
determined that where a seller fully performed all or "certain installments of a
divisible contract," the proper remedy was an action for the price under section
2-709 of the Code. 66 Since the court held that the seller's complaint precluded
recovery off the contract, there remains the question whether, under the Code, an
aggrieved party retains an option to rescind and sue off the contract, in quantum
meruit.
The general scheme of Article 2, as relates to the ability of an innocent party to
put an end to a contract and sue for damages, is quite simple. Looking at this issue
from the perspective of the innocent buyer, where that party has a right to cancel, 67
the party may, in addition to exercising that right, recover any payments made to the
seller and also recover either the difference between the contract price and the price
of a substitute contract or the difference between the contract price and the market
price of the goods at the time the buyer learned of the breach. 68 Thus, the buyer can
end the contract and receive restitution of the contract price paid plus expectation
damages. This was not always the case. 69 Indeed, under pre-Code law, the buyer was
required to elect her remedies and either rescind the contract and sue off the contract
63. 165 Conn. at 315, 334 A.2d at 434. The reasonable (translate market) value of the goods was higher than the
contract price.
64. If one were using the common law forms of action, quantum meruit would refer to cases where the
nonbreaching party rendered services; quantum valebat (singular, or valebant, plural) would be used in cases where
the nonbreaching party sold and delivered goods. In either case, the plaintiff is seeking the value of what was rendered
to the defendant.
Professor Murray urges that the term "rescission" should be used solely to describe the discharge of a contract by
mutual agreement of the parties. J. Mussuw, supra note 19 § 252, at 510, n.41. See also, CORBIN, COTrMACTs § 1104, at
558 (1964). However, courts often use the term to describe a party's unilateral ending of a contract for cause, followed
by a suit off the contract seeking restitutionary damages. See, e.g., Boomer v. Muir, 24 P.2d 570, 573 (Cal. App. 1933).
On the myriad meanings of rescission, see J. Wlm AN R. SusmErs, supra note 7, at 295 and Mooney, supra note 3, at
238, n.36.
For the purposes of this Article, "rescission" refers to a nonbreaching party's unilateral ending of a contract due to
the breach of the other party. This use of the terms is, I recognize, technically inaccurate; it is, however, consistent with
the use of the term in many court decisions and the U.S.A. More importantly, it is this meaning, combined with the notion
of "election of remedies," which caused such a negative reaction among the Code drafters. See infra note 71 and 86.
65. 165 Conn. at 315, 334 A.2d at 434.
66. Id.
67. Such a right exists because of (a) the seller's failure to deliver, (b) the seller's repudiation, or (c) the buyer's
rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of acceptance. See § 2-711(1).
68. § 2-71 1(l)(a) and (b). This does not include cases where the seller is insolvent. See Nordstrom, supra note 33,
at 1177-78 (discussing § 2-502).
Other remedies enumerated in § 2-711(2) and (3) are not relevant to this discussion.
69. See Nordstrom, supra note 33, at 1175.
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for return of the price paid or sue on the contract and recover damages for breach.7 0
All of this ended with the enactment of section 2-711. 71
On the seller's side, pre-Code law prohibited the seller who had fully performed
from rescinding the contract and suing off the contract for the value of the goods
delivered and accepted; she had to sue on the contract for the contract price.72 This
followed from the application of a general rule which provided that a party who had
completely performed a contract and was only due the payment of money could not
sue off the contract, in quantum meruit, when the other party materially breached.
Rather, the nonbreaching party was required to sue on the contract for the contract
price. 73 One reason given for this peculiar circumstance 74 is that a debt was created
by the party's full performance and suit had to be on that debt;75 yet another reason
is that a party should not get more than what was contracted for in exchange for her
performance. 76 Conversely, a nonbreaching party who had not completely or near
completely performed prior to the material breach of the other contract party had the
option of suing on the contract, and receiving appropriate contract damages, or
"rescinding" the contract and suing in quantum meruit. It was necessary in the
quantum meruit action that the plaintiff rescind the contract; this act of ending the
contract, making it a nullity, allowed the court to disregard the contract price and
award damages based upon the fair market value of the goods or services rendered. 77
Things became tricky when the plaintiff was to render performance in install-
ments. For example, should the breach of such a contract after, say, three-fifths of the
70. See, e.g., U.S.A. § 69, reprinted in I U.L.A. 294-95 (1950) (buyer's remedies for breach of warranty). As
used in this Article, "election of remedies" refers specifically to a choice between a contract damage remedy and a
restitutionary remedy. There is still, in the general sense, some election of remedy under the Code. See, e.g., the buyer's
alternative remedies under 99 2-712, 2-713 and 2-714.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 67 and 68. Karl Llewellyn stated flatly that U.S.A. § 69(2)'s "rule of
election for buyers [did] not make sense." Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society: 11, 37 COL. L. Rav. 341, 390
(1937). He expressed sympathy for the buyer who, having returned defective goods, learned to her dismay that she had
"claimed and been granted" a remedy and was limited to recovery of the purchase price. Id. at 391. Llewellyn's views
are reflected in § 2-711.
The Code Drafters' intention to remove the old shibboleth of "election of remedies" for the aggrieved buyer is also
seen in the provisions governing revocation of acceptance. Comment I to § 2-608 states that:
Mhe buyer is no longer required to elect between revocation of acceptance and recovery of damages for breach.
Both are now available to him .... The section no longer speaks of 'rescission,' a term capable of ambiguous
application . . . and susceptible also of confusion with cancellation for cause ....
It should be noted that restitution under § 2-711 does not result from the old "rescission" but rather from the buyer's
exercise of the right to cancel and pursue the contract remedies provided by the Code.
72. See Nordstrom, supra note 33, at 1152. Any references to off-contract remedies apply solely to actions brought
by nonbreaching parties; this Article does not address off-contract suits by breaching parties. See, e.g., Rtsrismmmwr
(SEcN,) OF Co'nxAcrs § 374.
73. Oliver v. Campbell, 273 P.2d 15 (S. Ct. Cal. 1954). This was a case involving the services of an attorney and
not the sale of goods; however, it is recognized as stating a rule which was applied in the sales context as well. See,
Nordstrom, supra, note 33, at 1152.
74. Perhaps it is more peculiar that the partially performing plaintiff could recover in excess of the contract price
in a quantum meruit action. See, Palmer, The Contract Price as a Limit on Restitutionfor Defendant's Breach, 20 Owo ST.
L.J. 264, 269-70 (1959).
75. This rationale can be traced to the debt origins of common law informal contract actions. See, J. CAL.AARI AND
J. Paw.o, supra note 55, at 577.
76. See, Palmer, supra note 74, at 266.
77. Rescission in those cases referred not only to the cancellation of an executory portion of a contract but also to
the actual nullificationldestruction of the contractual agreement. See, Nordstrom, supra note 33, at 1165, n.94; Palmer,
supra note 74, at 273. Both Palmer and Nordstrom criticized the concept of destroying the contract as a necessary
prerequisite to the award of restitutionary relief in excess of the contract price.
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performance was rendered allow the innocent party to sue in quantum meruit? If the
contract was "divisible," meaning that each performance block constituted a
separate contract, then breach after three of five performances would not necessarily
entitle a nonbreaching party to sue off the contract. In other words, after rendering
each performance, it would be as though the performance of that "divisible" contract
was complete, thus invoking the full performance rule.7 8
In Wellston Coal Co. v. Franklin Paper Co. ,79 the parties had entered a contract
whereby the plaintiff seller was to supply the defendant buyer's needs for coal during
a one-year period. The buyer purchased coal as agreed during the months when the
contract price was lower than market price. However when the contract and market
prices were the same, the buyer repudiated the contract. The court found that the
buyer had prevented the seller from completing performance of the contract;
therefore, the seller could rescind the contract and sue in quantum meruit, recovering
the difference between the contract price paid by the buyer and the higher market
price. 80 The result in Wellston was consistent with many pre-Code cases. 8t
The question then is whether, given similar facts, the same result could be
reached under the UCC. Since the Code does not explicitly provide for restitutionary
recovery 82 resolution of this issue requires consideration of the provisions of section
1-103 of the Code: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the
principles of law and equity including the law merchant and the law relative to
capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress,
coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall
supplement its provisions." Can it be said that the Code "displaces" the common
law remedy of off-contract restitutionary recovery for the aggrieved seller in an
installment contract? 83
Because pre-Code law, including the USA, 84 ascribed an election of remedies to
a party's rescission of a contract, the Code eschews rescission, preferring instead the
78. See 1 G. PALiER, THE LAW OF REsrnrruloN § 4.16(a), at 500 (1978). This was the rationale of the court in
Kunian.
79. 57 Ohio St. 182, 48 N.E. 888 (1897).
80. Id. at 185. 48 N.E. 889. The court impliedly found the contract was "entire" and "not divisible." Accord,
Smith v. Keith & Perry Coal Co., 36 Mo. App. 567 (1889) (in this case, the court expressly found the contract to be
"entire").
81. See 3 WIUSTON, SALES § 593, at 282 (rev. ed. 1948) and cases cited therein. Williston implied that in a partially
performed entire contract, the seller would be unable to sue on the contract. See also Nordstrom, supra note 33, at 1165.
Nordstrom noted that in non-sales cases the plaintiff's recovery was often limited by the contract price.
82. For the remainder of this discussion, "restitutionary recovery" will refer to the installment seller's recovery
in excess of the contract price. If the seller is allowed a restitutionary recovery under the Code, there remains the question
of whether incidental damages should be allowed. See I G. PALsMs, supra note 78 § 4.8, at 435-36.
83. For all intents and purposes, the availability of rescission and suit off the contract is a non-issue for the buyer
in any kind of contract governed by the UCC. In the vast majority of cases, the buyer's performance would consist of
payment of the contract price; upon cancellation, the buyer has the right to the return of any moneys paid as well as to
other remedies under the Code. See § 2-711(1) and supra text accompanying notes 67 and 68. Therefore, the option is
attractive primarily to a seller who may be able to recover an amount in excess of the contract price of the goods sold.
Because the policy issues presented by such a suit do not exist in an action for specific restitution, the latter is not included
in the ensuing discussion.
84. See U.S.A. §§ 61, 65 (seller) and 69(2) (buyer), reprinted in IA U.L.A. 150, 233, 294-95 (1950). The seller,
under certain circumstances, could rescind and still sue for damages on the contract; the buyer could not. Llewellyn
criticized this "inconsistent combination." Llewellyn, supra note 71, at 390.
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term cancellation. 85 Whenever the term rescission is used in the Code, the
preservation of contract rights is clearly stated.86 However, a distaste for rescission
and election of remedies does not necessarily equate with prohibition of a restitution-
ary recovery. Indeed, Professors Nordstrom and Palmer have argued that rescission
is an unnecessary prerequisite to a restitutionary recovery. 87 Professor Palmer further
argued that a restitutionary recovery on the contract is appropriate and the contract
price does not necessarily limit that recovery. 88
Both Nordstrom and Palmer have concluded that restitutionary recovery is avail-
able under the Code. Nordstrom, in his seminal article on restitutution and Article 2,
made his case by relying on the seller's right to cancel under section 2-703 (f)89 and
the definition of cancellation in section 2-106 (4).90 These provisions, he argued,
coupled with pre-Code restitution cases which could give specific meaning to the
words "cancel" and "remedy," would justify an above contract recovery. 9' Palmer,
while acknowledging that the catalogue of a seller's remedies in section 2-703 does
not include restitution, 92 nevertheless concluded that such a remedy should be allowed:
since it is reasonably clear that the problems of restitution were not considered in the
drafting of the Code. Restitution is governed by principles that cut across many kinds of
transactions, including sales of goods, and these principles should not be set aside by a statute
drawn with no such purpose in mind. 93
85. See e.g., § 2-703(0, infra note 89, and comment I to § 2-703 ("This Article rejects any doctrine of election
of remedies ... ). See also supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. Mooney describes rescission and election of
remedies as "[tlwo casualties" of the Code's change of prior contract rules. Mooney, supra note 3, at 237, n.36.
Llewellyn acknowledged that "[rescission, properly handled, is a needed remedy." Id. at 388. However, given his
views on election (see supra note 71), it is logical to conclude that the "needed remedy" to which he referred was the
right to unilateral termination of the contract when the other party breached, with retention of the right to damages.
86. See § 2-720:
"Unless the contrary intention clearly appears, expressions of 'cancellation' or 'rescission' of the contract or the like
shall not be construed as a renunication or discharge of any claim in damages for antecedent breach."
And the comment following § 2-720 states:
"This section is designed to safeguard a person holding a right of action from any unintentional loss of rights by the
ill-advised use of such terms as 'cancellation', 'rescission', or the like."
See also, § 2-608, supra note 71 and § 2-721, the section on remedies for fraud and the comment thereto which
states that the section "makes it clear that . rescission of the contract for fraud . . . [does not automatically bar]
other remedies .... "
87. Nordstrom, supra note 33, at 1165, n. 94; Palmer, supra note 74, at 274.
88. Palmer, supra note 74, at 274, citing CoRBIN, Co.l-mAcrs §§ 1102, 1104, and 1113 (1951).
89. § 2-703 states:
Where the buyer wrongfully rejects or revokes acceptance of goods or fails to make a payment due on or before
delivery or repudiates with respect to a part or the whole, then with respect to any goods directly affected and,
if the breach is of the whole contract (§ 2-612), then also with respect to the whole undelivered balance, the
aggrieved seller may . ..
(0 cancel.
90. § 2-106 states:
"(4) 'Cancellation' occurs when either party puts an end to the contract for breach by the other and its effect is the
same as that of 'termination' except that the cancelling party also retains any remedy for breach of the whole contract or
any unperformed balance."
91. Nordstrom, supra note 33, at 1166. Accord I G. PAL.iER, supra note 78 § 4.16(a), at 501.
92. Comment I to § 2-703 provides that the remedies listed in that section "include all of the available remedies
for breach." However, as one commentator has pointed out, the Code provides other seller's remedies not listed in §
2-703. See Hillman, Construction of the Uniform Commercial Code: UCC Section 1-103 and 'Code' Methodology, 18
B.C. INo. & Co'.m. L. REv. 655, 708, n. 303 (1977) (referring to the remedies in § 2-718). See also 1 G. PAmlsiE, supra
note 78 § 4.16, at 500-01, n. 11 (noting cases where courts granted sellers remedies not listed in § 2-703).
93. 1 G. PAL.iER, supra note 78 § 4.16(a), at 501. "Restitution based upon unjust enrichment cuts across many
branches of the law, including contract, tort, and fiduciary relationship, but it also occupies much territory that is its sole
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Apparent support for a restitutionary recovery can be found in two more Code
provisions. Comment 1 to section 1-102 does, with approval, refer to pre-Code cases
where courts "implemented a statutory policy with liberal and useful remedies not
provided in the statutory text." Yet, the explicit remedial policy of the Code is stated
in section 1-106 to include liberal administration of the remedies provided in the
Code "to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good [not better] a position
as if the other party had fully performed. . . ,,94 In addition, comment 1 to section
2-607 provides that the buyer is to pay for goods accepted a price "to be reasonably
apportioned, using the type of apportionment familiar to the courts in quantum
valebant cases." However, section 2-607 (1) explicitly states that the buyer is to pay
"at the contract rate" for any goods accepted. Comment 1 begins with the statement
that, once the buyer accepts goods, the seller acquires a right to the price as provided
by the contract. Only the apportionment technique is borrowed from the restitution
cases. 95
When rescission prevailed, an above contract recovery was justified by the
destruction of the contract. 96 That rationale is no longer maintainable 97 and is
inconsistent with the Code's emphasis on commercial reality. 98 Palmer implied that
an above contract recovery is justified because the partially performing party, whose
full performance was prevented by the breaching party, never bargained to exchange
proportional performance for pro rata contract price.99 But, consistent with this
point, Palmer also states that if a contract is divisible, recovery for part performance
would be limited to the contract price. 100 Thus, with the installment seller, the nature
of any recovery would depend upon a determination of whether the contract was
divisible or entire. 10 1
Comment 2 to section 2-612 states unequivocally that the distinction between
divisible and entire contracts has no validity under Article 2.102 Granted, the
preserve." Id. § 1.1, at 2. Professor Palmer outlines the scope of restitution and traces the history of quasi-contract in §§
1.1 and 1.2 of his treatise. See also Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Context, 73 COL. L. Rsv. 1209, 1215-16 (1973)
(discussing the common law restitution action of general assumpsit).
94. Accord Mather, supra note 33, at 21 n. 20; Hillman, supra note 92, at 709.
95. Mather, supra note 33, at 20, n.21. Mather concluded that any partially performing seller (not only one in a
sale of goods contract) should be precluded from recovering in excess of the contract price, since such a recovery conflicts
with liberal principles of justice. These principles "impel courts to protect personal liberty and minimize coercion." Id.
at 48.
96. See supra text accompanying note 78.
97. See supra note 78.
98. Even when the courts spoke of the destruction of a contract, the decisions clearly indicated that the existence
of the contract was central to the plaintiff's case. See Palmer, supra note 74, at 273.
99. Palmer, supra note 74, at 276. Similarly, the defendant is not entitled to the overall contract gains "on an
accrual basis," which would occur if a court limited the plaintiff to a pro-rated contract price recovery. Id. Palmer
cautioned, however, that a breach which justified termination of a contract did not necessarily justify restitutionary
remedies (id. at 280), and stated that "considerations of fairness" should determine the proper outcome in a given case.
Id. at 281.
100. Id. at 279. See supra text accompanying note 76. While the full performance rule, which underlies this
conclusion, has been attacked as unreasonable, it remains the law in most jurisidictions. 1 G. PALImR, supra note 78 § 4.3,
at 378; Nordstrom, supra note 33, at 1152, n.41.
101. Nordstrom also retains this distinction. Nordstrom, supra note 33, at 1166.
102. Comment 2 of § 2-612 states:
"If separate acceptance of separate deliveries is contemplated, no generalized contrast between wholly 'entire' and
wholly 'divisible' contracts has any standing under this Article."
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comment generally addresses the applicability of the rules in section 2-612103 and not
the availability of restitutionary relief to an installment seller. However, resort to a
distinction so definitively abandoned for all of Article 2 (and not just section 2-612
(1)) should be based upon a clearly stated Code policy to allow restitutionary
recovery. As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, no such policy exists.
The resolution of this issue lies less in the explicit damage provisions of Article
2 than in the overall remedial goal contained in section 1-106. The goal of
compensation is emphasized both in the wording of the section and in the
accompanying comments. 0 4 Arguably, the seller's recovery of an amount in excess
of the contract price for goods is overcompensation. 105 Furthermore, it is commer-
cially reasonable 0 6 to define adequate compensation by the terms of the parties'
agreement, especially where the issue is the price of accepted goods.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has addressed two issues: reinstatement by suit under UCC section
2-612(3) and the installment seller's right to restitutionary recovery under Article 2.
Each issue required an examination of fundamental Code policies and the conclusions
reached flow from those policies. Specifically, the jurisprudential underpinnings of
the Code and the purposes underlying Article 2 point strongly to the conclusion that,
where an aggrieved party in an installment contract overtly cancels, as provided in
UCC section 2-612(3), that party's subsequent suit to recover damages on past
installments does not reinstate the contract. Furthermore, a seller who sues on past
installments should not be allowed a restitutionary recovery. Indeed, a restitution-
based recovery by any seller of goods is inconsistent with the remedial policy and
commercial character of the Code.
Corbin referred to the words divisible and entire as "'terms of confusion." CORBIN, Co.'rmcrs § 694, at 277. The
confusion increased exponentially in installment sales contracts. Id. § 699, at 304. He listed fourteen different issues (not
including restitutionary recovery) to which these concepts have been applied and concluded that courts should decide the
issues based on "policy and precedent," not by labeling a contract as divisible or entire. Id. § 695, at 284-89.
It is reasonable to conclude that the Code drafters reacted to the aforementioned confusion in discarding the divisible/
entire distincton.
103. The tension between the installment contract definition and the provisions of § 2-307 (presumption of delivery
in a single lot) is discussed in Peters, supra note 49, at 223-24.
104. See comment 1: "[Clompensatory damages are limited to compensation."
105. See Hillman, supra note 92, at 708-09. Cf. J. White and R. Summers, supra note 7, at 282-83 (arguing that
a buyer should be able to limit a seller to recovery under section 2-708(2), where recovery under section 2-708(1) would
result in overeompensation).
106. "Commercially reasonable" appears several times in Article 2 (see e.g., 99 2-402, 2-609(1), 2-610(a),
2-706(2)); however, one must be careful not to ascribe an absolute meaning to so relative a term. See Mellinkoff, supra
note 40, at 210-13. As used here, it means what makes good sense in a commercial context.

